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ABSTRACT 
 
Indeed, the recent emphasis on eco-political governance is 
Nigeria is unique in that it was initiated by external donors 
(international organizations) and not by domestic leaders 
under pressure from their own constituencies. Thus, while 
Nigeria have embraced the market economy and liberalized 
their policies; issues related to political participation, 
democracy and institution building have proven harder to 
tackle. This paper therefore argued that government must 
devote resources and political will to overcoming the harsh 
poverty experienced by the majority of Nigerians. In this 
regard, the emerging participatory e-development and 
traditional development strategies should not be seen as 
mutually exclusive but rather complementary (so as to avert 
the status of a failed state). 
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1.0 INRODUCTION 
 
Broadly, governance refers to the exercise of power through a country’s 
economic, social, and political institutions in which institutions represent the 
organizational rules and routines, formal Laws and informal norms that 
together shape the incentives of public policy makers, overseers, and 
providers of public services. Referred to as the rules of the game, governance 
has three key dimensions: 
 
(I) The process by which governments are selected held accountable, 
monitored, and replaced. 
(II) The capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and to 
formulate, implement and enforce sound policies and regulations.  
(III) And respect for institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions  (World Bank, 2002) 
 
Essentially, governance comprises mechanisms processes and institutions, 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their 
legal rights, meet their legal obligations and mediate their differences. In 
other words, it encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the 
environment in which economic operators function and in determining the 
distribution of benefits as well as the relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled. However, good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and 
enlightened policy making (transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued 
with a professional ethos; as executive arm of government accountable for its 
actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all 
behaving under the rule of law (rationally). In other words, in the context of a 
political and institutional environment that upholds human rights, democratic 
principles, and the rule of law, good governance is the transparent and 
accountable management of human, natural economic and financial resources 
for equitable and sustainable development. Equally, it entails clear decision 
making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and 
accountable institutions, the primacy of law in managing and distributing 
resources and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures 
that aim to prevent and combat corruption. 
 
Unfortunately, good governance can be undermined by a range of factors 
including lack of transparency, weak accountability, poor organization and 
lack of technical capacity, lack of responsiveness, inefficiency, and poor 
motivation. Yet, corruption is often both a cause and an effect of week 
governance. However, poor governance and corruption can hurt the poor 
through a multiplicity of routs. That is, on a corrupt government, social 
interests and economic priorities play little role in the allocation of public 
resources. Thus, when analyzing the sources and impact of corruption, it is 
helpful to distinguish between two broad types of corruption: State capture 
(which distorts the framework of rules) and Administrative corruption (which 
distorts the implementation of rules.) Here, state capture refers to actions 
that individuals, groups or firms in both the public and private sectors take to 
influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and policies to their 
own advantage. Critically, this occurs through illicit and non-transparent 
transfer or concentration of private benefits to public officials. As a result, 
biases that serves private game usually at a significant cost to society. On the 
other hand, administrative corruption refers to the intentional imposition of 
distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules and 
regulations to provide advantage to their state or non-state participants as a 
result of the illegal transfer or concentration of private gains to public 
officials. 
 
Consequently, the problems of poverty and governance are inextricably 
linked. If power is abused or exercised in weak or improper ways, those with 
least power (the poor) are most likely to suffer. In other words, weak 
governance compromises the delivery of services and benefits to those who 
need them most; the influence of powerful interest groups biases policies, 
programs, and spending away from the poor; and lack of proprietary rights, 
police protection, and legal services disadvantage the poor and inhibit them 
from securing their homes and other assets and operating businesses. Thus, 
poor governance generates and reinforces poverty and subverts efforts to 
reduce it. However, accountability and transparency provide strong incentives 
for good governance. Infact, they are essential characteristics of well-
functioning institutions and good public sector performance. Here, their 
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existence is closely linked to the architecture of the state, which defines the 
relationships among the executive, legislature, and judiciary; and extent to 
which they are able to scrutinize each other’s behaviour. 
Again, accountability and transparency equally depend on other institutional 
arrangements for the transfer of power between governments, including 
voting arrangements and electoral laws. Yet, there are formal governance 
arrangements that support this architecture. On one hand, the arrangement 
comprises electoral rules that mandate regular and fair competition between 
seekers of political office. On the other hand, it requires inclusive 
arrangements for the exercise of power that offer the protection of the law to 
all citizens (and that can be guaranteed by an independent judiciary).  
Furthermore, the ability to call state officials and public employees to account 
is fundamental. Typically, people must account for their policies and actions, 
as well as for their use of funds. Similarly, employees must be accountable to 
their superiors within the executive; and the executive as a whole must be 
accountable to the electorate and to the other main institutions of the state. 
Indeed, holding government (executive) accountable rests on two 
foundations: 
 
(I) There must be some bodies or groups to which the executive answers 
 and;  
 
(II) In situations where certain executive actions are questionable, then 
 legislative, judicial, legal or electoral challenges should be possible.   
 
In the alternative, popular challenges have sometimes been successful. 
Comparatively, horizontal accountability concerns relationships between the 
executive and the other main institutions of the state (Legislative and 
judiciary) while vertical accountability refers to relationships in which one 
actor must report to another. Thus, depending on constitutional 
arrangements, sub-national governments may be seen either as subordinated 
or as having equivalent rights to central governments; these accountability 
relationships are reinforced by informal checks executed civil society as well 
as donors. 
Graphically, figure 1; illustrates these relationships. 
Therefore, it is a crucial first step to assess the ways in which weak 
governance and corruption are hurting the poor in Nigeria setting; but it is 
quite another to more beyond assessment to build a lasting strategy. Thus, as 
initial assessment of the situation is critical both to understand the problems 
and to identify opposition and possible allies. Yet, more detailed diagnostics 
can be undertaken as reforms progress. In most cases, it is advisable for 
reforms to start on a small scale and build outward. However, it is likely that 
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in the course of implementation, the underlying problems will themselves be 
redefined. Again, constituencies and political will for reforms are essential. 
And rarely will they be fully developed at the start but the strategy should aim 
to build them along the way. To find an entry point and get the process 
started, there needs to be at least one source of commitment, whether from 
a civil society group; or a legislative, judicial or government body; or a 
political party. 
Definitely, the nature of the constituency will influence what can be done 
first; and if there are only a few stake holders, the initial work will be limited 
and it is more important to design it so as to appeal to broader interests. Yet 
certain kinds of institutional strengthening (especially those that enhance 
available information) are critical to help organizational leadership understand 
and cope with problems; as well as providing a means of combating 
corruption. Once the reforms needed have been classified, it is important to 
bridge the gap between external stakeholders and the executive (or 
legislature or judiciary) depending on the locus of the reform. Although, 
pressure from outside may be an essential ingredient to initiate the process; 
progress will be limited unless the executive or other state entity is clear 
about what is needed and how to  
 
FIGURE 1.1 EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: RESPONSIBILITY 
SCHEME 
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 8
deliver it as well as having the capacity to do so. 
Alternatively, proposed reforms may be led from within, in which case, those on 
the inside should communicate their purposes and invite public debate and results 
monitoring. 
 
Yet, in building a strategy, it may be helpful to reflect on some main factors and 
characteristics of the country’s institutional environment that will strongly shape 
the possibilities for effective institutional and policy reform and the sequencing of 
reforms. Thus, three relevant factors are identified: political commitment, political 
feasibility and sustainability. Since the benefit of reform must outweigh the costs, 
meeting these conditions does not guarantee that a reform will succeed; but it 
might indicate a higher probability of success. To the extent that important 
elements of the government’s support base are negatively affected, political 
leaders’ commitment to reforms is reduced. However, to the extent that key 
groups supporting the government are expected to benefit from the proposed 
reforms, political commitment will be strengthened. Consequently, the following 
research question arises: 
I) who gains and who is likely to lose from the proposed reforms? 
II) Are any of these groups in the government’s current support base? 
III) Are any of the groups that stand to win or lose swing groups (i.e. groups 
that are critical to the government’s ability threaten to shift their support to the 
opposition? 
IV) Within the past fifty years of Nigerian independence, has there been any 
attempt at reforms in this sector by the present government or by previous 
government with substantially the same support base? 
V) Is Nigeria really a failed state? 
VI) And what is the way forward? 
 
In fact, even if the governance reforms are politically desirable, they may not be 
politically feasible. Thus, to bring about institutional change, government decision 
makers must be able to ensure the support and cooperation of other parts of 
government which are critical to approving and implementing the reform project 
(such as the legislature, bureaucracy and judiciary). However, assessing the 
strength of opposition to reforms is important, as it entails identifying the critical 
veto gates or institutional junctures, at which particular actors can block the 
government’s reform initiative. Specifically, we ask who within the government 
needs to approve the proposed reform for its enactment and who might be 
opposed to the reform project with reasons. Further more, we ask what change in 
the design of the reform might win their support and which groups outside 
governments are known to be opposed to the reforms. Again, we ask which 
organizations or groups (such as tax officials, law enforcement agents, 
government regulators, and clerks) will have to perform tasks to implement the 
reforms; and how their interests and incentives are being taken into amount. 
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Indeed the sustainability of governance reform is dependent on whether the 
current government can expect to be in power with a reform friendly support 
base) long enough to ensure implementation. In other words if a government 
comes in power that opposes reforms, the key question is weather the new 
government would wish to continue with them. However, if the reform benefits 
certain groups, these groups may be able to pressure the new government to 
continue the reforms; or attention may need to be paid to the extent to which 
powerful private interests can subvert policy design and implementation. 
 
 Perhaps, most important for sustainability is the match between the design of 
reforms and the environment in which they must take root if they are to be 
effective. It is equally important to understand the workings of the rules in the 
society, the extent of informality, the role of informal networks and the way in 
which power and influence are exercised if reforms are to be relevant to their 
institutional context. Here, strategies must start with feasible steps that lead by 
their internal logic and by the public and other support they generate toward long 
term sustainable reforms that help the poor (such as in the Nigeria context) Thus, 
the rest of these paper is divided into six sections. Section two looks at the Nigeria 
political regimes so far. Nigerian economic performance is the subject matter of 
section three while section four examines the social security situation in Nigeria. 
The religious morality status of Nigeria is highlighted in section five. Policy reform 
options are presented in section six while section seven concludes the paper. 
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2.0 NIGERIA: POLITICAL REGIMES 
 
 Politics has been a game of power and influence all over the world. Indeed, 
Nigeria within one century (1862 -1990) of colonial rule had five distinct 
constitutions (1992, 1946, 1951, 1954, 1960) used by colonial officials to refine 
the political arena. Infect, this was also used as a means to control nationalism 
and the political evolution of the country. Thus, from the times of amalgamation of 
the northern and southern protectorates along with the colony of Lagos in 1914, 
the earliest political structure was predicted on unitarism. Apart from the hues and 
cries that greeted the various British constitutional enactments, we may not have 
largely ignored the fact that certain personalities and groups (with an advantage 
of foresight) had cautioned that the country was sliding towards balkanization 
instead of independence. Specifically, the conference of Nigerian students held in 
Scotland (1949) was of the opinion that one of the chief weaknesses of the 1943 
constitution was the arbitrary regionalization of the country, based on the equal 
unsatisfactory provincial groupings initiated at the beginning of the British rule. 
They therefore suggested that as necessary condition of achieving that unity in 
diversity as expressed in the Richards constitution, the basis of regionalization 
must be examined. Yet another vexed issue that gave rise to the political anomaly 
bedeviling the Nigerian federation was the encouragement of partisan politics 
along ethnic ties in fact, this was a creation of the British lords under its “Divide 
and Rule” stratagem. Although 26 political parties were enlisted by electoral 
commission of Nigeria to contest the 1959 elections, here the three dominant 
political parties were the northern people congress (NPC), Action group and 
national council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC). However, it was not surprising 
that the partisanship that preceded the 1959 elections were characterized by all 
manner of ethnic bestialities and postulations. And as the quest for independence 
gathered momentum, it was clear that the stage for an electoral crisis has been 
set following the enthronement of brinkmanship, electoral malpractices and 
discrimination. Apart from the allegations of intimidation of political opponents and 
other foul politicking that trailed 1959 federal elections, it was widely believed to 
have been rigged in favor of the NPC. Consequently, Britain was accused of laying 
the foundation for electoral fraud and chaotic political system in Nigeria. 
Unfortunately, the British handed power to the North at independence, not 
because of an election result but because it was the only of as election result but 
because it was the only condition on which power would be granted. Incidentally, 
the NPC (Party) failed to gather majority votes that could have empowered it to 
form government. Subsequently, the NPC rules both the North and the federation, 
and yet its leaders refuse to change the name of the organization to permit the 
admission of southerners into its membership. 
 
Indeed, with the level of political temperament and manipulations that fuelled the 
elections which produced the first indigenous government, it was obvious that the 
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nation was literarily tottering on the edge of precipice. Thus, it was not long 
before political crisis erupted in western Nigeria but reached a crescendo in 1962. 
 
Regrettably, the degeneration of the rift between Chief Awolowo and the premier 
of western Nigeria (Chief Akintola) marked the beginning of a terrible political anti-
climax that culminated in the collapse of the first democratic experiment. 
Unfortunately, the events that trailed the 1962 leadership squabble and power 
game between Awolowo and Akintola not only tested the political sagacity of the 
independent Nigeria but the ability of the federal government to handle any major 
eventualities. In a bid to house the political conflagration, the federal government 
(under Prime Minister Abubarkar Tafawa Balewa) declared a state of emergency 
throughout the western region and banned its government. Subsequently, Senator 
M.A. Majekodunmi was appointed as the Administrator of western Nigeria. In fact, 
efforts by the Balewa government to find solution to the fledging political problems 
failed woefully as well as the predicament of conducting free, fair and acceptable 
polls. Again, not even the creation of a new electoral body known as Federal 
Electoral Commission (FEC) and the emergence of a tw0-party System, (NNA and 
UPGA) could save the nation the agony of another round of electoral crisis in 1964 
and 1965. Available evidence showed that the 1964 and 1965 elections conducted 
by the Balewa government were flagrantly rigged by the ruling party (NPC). In 
fact, the result of the poll was rejected by the opposition and the ensued 
commission led to wide spread socio-political violence including killing, arson, 
looting and destruction of properties, which provided the military the needed 
excuse to dethrone the government. Consequently, in January 15, 1966, there was 
the first military coup led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogu; which led to the 
killing of top politicians such as the premier of Northern Nigeria and prime 
Minister. Subsequently, General Aguiyi Ironsi became the first Military Head of 
State. Unfortunately, in July 7, 1996, a counter coup by officers of Northern 
extraction took place, where Gen. Ironsi and some other top military officers were 
killed. In the aftermath; Lt-Col Yakubu Gowon became military Head of state. 
However, anti-Igbo feelings as a result of the first coup led to the massacre of 
about 30,000 easterners resident in the north in May 29, 1967. Against this 
background, Colonel Odimegwu Ojukwu led the East into secession and declared 
Biafra Republic in May 30, 1967. Strategically Nigerian Civil war started in July 6, 
1967 and ended in January 15, 1970 with the handing over of the Biafra surrender 
document to Gen. Gowon by Philip Effiong at Dodan Barracks, Lagos. Yet, after 
some years, General Gowon was toppled in a blood less coup (on July 29, 1975) 
and General Murtala Mohammed succeeded him as the 3rd Military Head of state of 
Nigeria. Unfortunately, Gen. Mohammed was killed in a bloody (abortive) Military 
Coup in February 13, 1976 while General Olusegun Obasanjo became the 4th 
Military Head of state of Nigeria. Thus, in 1st January, 1978, Obasanjo officially 
lifted the ban on political activities to usher in the second Republic while the new 
1979 constitution provided for an American Presidential system of government 
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presented a fresh opportunity to correct the mistakes of the failed first Nigerian 
republic. 
 
Indeed, the new (1979) constitution introduced a system that was a clear 
departure from the parliamentary system of government operated independence 
and incorporated far-reaching reforms intended to overcome the shortcomings of 
the first republic. Apart from establishing a Federal Electoral Commission 
(FEDECO) to manage the electoral process; certain guidelines aimed at creating 
broad-based national parties and avoid post electoral condition were also provided 
for in that Constitution. In this respect, based on the Laid down guidelines, 
FEDECO registered five political parties which satisfied registration requirements: 
Unity party of Nigerian (UPN), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigeria peoples 
Party (NPP), people’s Redemption Party (PDP) and Great Nigeria People’s Party 
(GNPP). Incidentally beside the symbols and slogans, it was then obvious that the 
new parties were a reincarnation of the tri-regional parties of the first Republic. In 
fact, the same actors manifesting tendencies that threw up deep-rooted ethnic 
sentiments were back on the political area in a fierce struggle for the control of 
the reins of power in the Federal Republic (even though a nineteen-state structure 
had emerged in the Nigerian polity. Even though, this 1979 election had a 
reputation as free, fair and peaceful, it was evident that the nation was yet to 
overcome its political inertia. In other words, the failure of NPN (which was 
declared winner after a protracted legal tussle) to win the number of seats that 
could allow it to control the National Assembly forced it into a coalition with the 
NPP. Thus, at the end of the first four year term (1979-1983), it was obvious that 
Nigerians were disenchanted the poor run of the democracy experiment and 
therefore desired a change. But the 1983 elections conducted by Shagari led 
government turned into a fiasco; and was totally described as one of the most 
fraudulent elections in the history of elections in Nigeria. Regrettably, the elections 
were bastardized by the misuse of the power of incumbency, money and the 
politics of bitterness and intolerance inherited form the first Republic. Again, the 
uproar generated by the outcome of the election which NPN was alleged to have 
rigged in its favour was yet to settle when the military struck again in December 
31, 1983. In other words, Major-General Muhammadu Buhari in a bloodless coup. 
Subsequently, this junta clamped many politicians in detention and promulgated 
decree No 4 which severely limited press freedom. 
In August 27, 1985 General Ibrahim Babangida seized power in a military putsch 
and assumes the title of president as the 5th military head of State. 
 
Although, General Babangida led government attempted to prevent this 
attachment to ethnic and primordial sentiments by introducing a two party 
structure in 1991 (Social Democratic Party and National Republican Convention); 
the democratic experiment also failed. However, in June 12, 1993, Chief Moshood 
Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) won the presidential election that was 
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widely acclaimed as the freest and fairest in Nigeria. Unfortunately, in June 23, 
1993, the June 12 presidential election was annulled, sparking nation wide 
unrests. Consequently, Chief Ernest Shonekan was made the Head of the Interim 
National Government in Aug 26, 1993. Subsequently, General Sani Abacha seized 
power from shonekan to become Nigerian sixth military Head of state in November 
17, 1993. In Mysterious circumstances at the Aso Rock presidential Villa, Abacha 
died in June 8, 1998. And thus, General Abdulsaani Abubarkar became the 7th 
Military head of state in June 9, 1998. Although General Obasanjo was released 
from Abacha’s detention, Abiola died in the custody of the Military Regime. 
 
Indeed, the 1999 Nigerian Constitution provides in section 131, the four 
qualifications for the office of the president: he must be a citizen of Nigeria by 
birth; must attain the age of forty years; he must be a member of a political party 
and sponsored by that political party; and must be educated up to at least school 
certificate level or its equivalent. However, the PDP Zoning arrangement was used 
to placate the south west for the annulment of the popular June 12 election. The 
North was therefore forced to concede power to the south after several years of 
governance of Nigeria. Thus, this made it possible for the former military head of 
state (General Obasanjo) to emerge as Nigerian president in 1999. In other words, 
in May 29, 1999, Chief Obasanjo was sworn in as Nigeria’s second dated president 
on the plat form of the peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Similarly, in May 29, 
2003, Chief Obasanjo was again sworn in for a second term as the Nigerian 
president. Between November 16th and 17th, Mr. Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was chosen 
as the presidential candidate of the ruling PDP for the April 2007 election. 
However, Yar’Adua’s success in the primary was attributed to the support of 
incumbent President Obasanjo; and shortly after winning the nomination, he chose 
Goodluck Jonathan as his Vice-presidential candidate. 
Subsequently, in May 29, 2007, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was sworn in as the new 
president and Head of State of Nigeria (in Nigeria’s first ever successful Civilian-to-
civilian transition) under the plat form of PDP after his declaration as the winner of 
the controversial election. Unfortunately in Nov 23, 2009, President Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua left Nigeria for Saudi Arabia to receive treatment for pericarditis disease; 
and this absence created a dangerous power vacuum in Nigeria. Consequently, in 
February 9, 201o, the senate determined that presidential power be transferred to 
the Vice President Goodluck Jonathan (and to serve as acting president) with all 
the accompanied powers until Yar’Adua returned to full health. As faith may have 
it, Yar’Adua died at the Aso Rock presidential villa (on May 5, 2010) and was 
buried on May 6th 2010 in his home town. Subsequently, the Acting president (Dr. 
Goodluck Jonathan) was sworn in as a substantive president of Nigeria by the 
Chief Justice of the Federation. 
 
When Prof Atta Jega was sworn in as the INEC (Independent National Electoral 
Commission) chairman on June 30, 2010 by President Goodluck Jonathan, he 
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acknowledged the expectations of Nigerians for credible, free and fair elections in 
2011 under the plat form of Electoral Act 2010 which repeals the Electoral Act 202 
2006 and Independent National Electoral Commission Act, Cap. 15, Laws of the 
federation of Nigeria, 2004 and enacts the Electoral Act, 2010 to regulate the 
conduct of Federal, State and Area Council elections. In accordance with the 
Nigerian Constitution, the bill for the new act was certified to have been carefully 
compared with the decision reached by the National Assembly and found to be 
true and correct decision of the Houses (and is in accordance with the provisions 
of the Acts Authentication Act Cap AZ, laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004) on 
the 16th August, 2010 by the Acting clerk to the National Assembly and 
subsequently assented the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of the 20th 
Day of August, 2010. However, barely three weeks after the assumption of office, 
INEC boss appears to be overwhelmed by the difficult task ahead, specially, the 
problem was that the time available for the new INEC team to produce an 
authentic Voters’ register and conduct free and fair elections was extremely short. 
In other words, the main argument hinge on the apparent slack in preparation by 
the electoral body (INEC) vis-a-vis the time frame drawn by the amended electoral 
Act 2010. Here, it was argued that if the amendments to the 1999 constitution 
should apply, the action was already running behind Schedule. In fact, in the 1999 
Constitution, section 145 and 190 require that elections be conducted in a 
maximum of 60 days to a minimum of 30 days before the expiration of the 
subsisting term of office. However, under the current constitutional amendment, it 
is required that elections be conducted in a minimum of 120 days and a maximum 
of 150 days before the expiration of the term of office of the last holder. If this 
provision should apply, it then means that election into offices in 2011 must be 
conducted not latter than January 2011. Furthermore, section 10 (1) of the 
proposed amendment to the 1999 Constitution states that INEC shall compile, 
maintain and update on a continuous basis, a National Register of Voters which 
shall include the names of all persons entitled to vote in any federal, state or local 
government or area council elections. However, section 100 (5) states that the 
registration of voters, updating and revision of the register of voters under the Act 
shall stop not later than 120 days before any election covered by the proposed 
amendment. This implies that if elections will hold in January 2010, it means that 
political parties ought to submit the names of their candidates by September 2010. 
Unfortunately, these dates were no longer feasible given the INEC forecast. 
 
Consequently, President Goodluck Jonathan forwarded a bill to the National 
Assembly for the amendment of the Electoral Act 2010 to provide for the alteration 
of the lines for the 2011 general elections. Specially, Jonathan urged the National 
Assembly to expeditiously amend the Electoral Act (2010) by proposing the 
amendment of the relevant laws as attached, through the inclusion of Transitional 
provisions to enable INEC to conduct the general elections between October and 
the end of April, 2011. Again, in the bill sent to the legislature seeking amendment 
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to the 2010 Electoral Act, INEC asked the Law makers to allow political parties to 
determine the choice of delegates. Specially, section 87 (70) of the Electoral Act 
should be amended to read: A political party that adopts the system of indirect 
primaries for the choice of its candidates shall outline in its constitution or guide 
lines; 
(I) who shall be a delegate to the congress or convention; and  
(II) In the case of democratically elected delegates, the procedure for the 
election of such delegates.  
INEC also proposed that section 25 of the Act should be amended to read: 
Elections into the offices of the President and Vice President, governor and deputy 
governor of a State and membership of the Senate, House of Representatives and 
House of Assembly of each State of the Federation shall be held on a date or 
dates and in a sequence to be determined by the INEC while subsection (3) of the 
section should be amended to read: provided that the said elections shall in the 
case of 2011 hold not latter than April 30, 2011. 
 
However, Former Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) president, SAN Agbakoba has 
always insisted that the assent of the president is required and instituted the case 
to get court clear the air on the matter. He stated that the constitution, which the 
country operated at independence, was assented to by the Acting Governor-
General of the country upon its amendment. Consequent upon this discovery, 
Agbakoba urged the Federal High Court (Lagos) to hold that the assent of the 
president is required on the amendments made to the 1999 constitution before 
they can become law. He further held that upon the discovery that there was a 
precedent and the court should hold that assent of the president is required on the 
amended constitution before it becomes Law and that the National Assembly did 
not comply with section 9 of the 1999 constitution as well as other necessary 
constitutional provisions. He therefore prayed that the court to urgently resolve 
the issue since INEC commenced preparation for the 2011 general election, which 
would be based on the provisions of the constitution (First Amendment) Act 2010. 
But the National Assembly in its preliminary objection) is urging the court to strike 
not the suit; based on three grounds: Lack of Locus stand, Lack of Jurisdiction and 
Lack of territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate. Again, beyond the areas bordering on 
the timeless for INEC I the act, the president sought amendments to section 87, 
subsection 12 (A,B) and sub section 13 of the Act which give the party caucus the 
power to determine the standard bearer of the party for elections and also give 
rights to appointed government officials to vote during congresses. Unfortunately, 
majority saw the request by President Jonathan for the amendment as self-serving 
as they argued that amending the section of the Act could only confer undue 
advantage during the presidential primaries on President Jonathan who is also as 
aspirant and would be competing at the congress where the standard bearer of 
the PDP (People Democratic Party) would be decided. Consequently, in October 
20, 2010, with as overwhelming majority voice vote, senate rejected president 
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Jonathan’s bill seeking for as amendment to the Electoral Act, 2010. However, the 
senate president tried to persuade the senators to consider looking at the 
unacceptable provisions with a view to removing all the offensive aspects. 
 
However, INEC recently ended months of speculations over the new guideline for 
full blown political activities by releasing the revised election time table for the 
2011 elections. Accordingly, National Assembly elections will be held on April 2, 
2011 and followed by the presidential election on April 9, 2011. Yet, this process is 
expected to come to an end on April 16, 2011 with the governorship and state 
House of Assembly. Unfortunately the conference of Nigeria political parties 
(CNPP) had issued complaints about the INEC time table. Basically, they are 
uncomfortable with the presidential poll placed ahead of those of Governorship 
and state Assemblies. This is because of the fact that presidential vote could have 
a Bandwagon effect by swaying voters to the winning party. Again, for the second 
phase of the amendments to the 1999 constitution, the National Assembly gets set 
to bequeath on the Nigerian Federation, a 48 state structure, in a fresh exercise 
that will herald the birth of twelve new states. Thus, in the emerging 48-state 
structure, three states are expected to be created in the South east; North West 
will have one, North central (two), North east (two), South West (two) and South 
South (two). Consequently, the emerging 48 state structure will ensure the parity 
of states in each Zone. In other words, each Zone will have equal number of 
states (eight states per zone). 
However, it is generally believed that the cost of presidential system of 
government is a huge drain on the country. Specifically, with their elephantine 
appetite for money, members of the National Assembly abuse their powers by 
enriching themselves at the expense of the people (tagged a case of looting by 
legislation). Using the advantage of their statutory responsibility as the approving 
authority for the annual Appropriation Act; the law makers have (over the years) 
become proficient at jacking up the various subheads in the national budget 
especially as it relates to allocations to the National Assembly and Ministries ready 
to do deals with them Her, usually included in the budget are generous provisions 
for constituency projects as well as the padding of the budget via inclusion of new 
subheads and unilateral increase of allocations to sectors. Unfortunately, the 
constituency project is unknown to our polity and in the first republic; we did not 
hear things of that nature. Again, the Legislator was virtually a part-time official 
and the salary of the minister in the first Republic was lower than that of a 
professor. Here, the permanent secretary earned more than a cabinet minister and 
the head of service earned more than the prime minister. Yet, going by the Last 
review by the Revenue mobilization and Fiscal Allocation Commission (RMFAC) in 
2009, the annual basic salary of the president of the senate is N2,484,242.50 
while that of his deputy is N2,309,166.75. Again, each senator receives a basic 
salary of N2, 026,200.00 per annum. For the speaker of the House of 
Representatives, it is N2, 477,110.00 while his deputy receives N2, 026,400.00. 
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Similarly, each member of the House of Representatives gets N1, 985,212.50 
annually, provisionally; they collect 125 per cent of their total package as 
constituency allowance annually while they are both entitled to 300 per cent of 
their package as severance gratuity in addition to ten percent recess allowance. 
The senate president and house speaker are equally to be provided with 
allowances for accommodation, furniture, motor vehicle maintenance, medical, 
special assistant, entertainment, utilities, security and domestic staff. 
Unfortunately, the law makers have refused to comply with the remuneration 
package stipulated for the house. In other words, members of the National 
Assembly have taken delight in violating the laws that set out remuneration 
because of their selfish interest. Here, such violations include arbitrary 
appointment of high number personal assistants (which regrettably is adding more 
cost to the running of government). But these allocations appear not to be the 
legislators’ major avenue of income. In fact, Many of them often force ministries, 
departments or agencies they over see to cough up huge amounts (other wise 
unfavorable reports are written about them to the security agencies). Again, over 
the years, it has been observed that senators and representatives are living a life 
far and above their legitimate incomes. In fact, with so much cash at their 
disposal, they are said o have gone on spending sprees, owing hotels and choice 
properties in Abuja (and other state capitals) much to the chagrin of the 
electorate.  
 
In the same vain, Nigerians are increasingly getting worried about what they 
describe as the PROFLIGACY’ of the president fuelled by his presidential ambition. 
In fact, a sign of the government’s wasteful spending is the depletion of the 
country’s external reserve from $42 billion to $38.2 billion as at September, 2010. 
Again, the last minute appropriations for project by Jonathan is to give impression 
that he is performing creditably within one year of his in auguration as president 
and so deserves to be duly elected in 2011 despite the alarm raised by RMAFC 
(Revenue mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission) that Nigerian is Leading 
for bankruptcy. Here, some of the identified problems include lack of financial 
discipline, corruption and over budgeting; which have combined to make it 
impossible for the country to meet even critical financial obligations (Such as 
servicing of debts owed local contractors, investment in infrastructure, importation 
and salaries payment). In general, one should be shocked to see how the 
presidency, federal, State and local governments Legislator’s, governors, ministers 
and democratic agencies (Like INEC) are brazenly frittering away public funds (in 
most cases of self-serving interests) in many ways in massaging the ego of 
sycophants, traditional rulers and hangers on. Clearly, while the nations treasury is 
at the mercy of the politicians (and they never lack) funds all always, funds are 
always hardly available for execution of capital project. Emphatically, since Nigeria 
returned to democracy, infrastructure decay (roads, railways, power supply) has 
worsened while all sectors (education, health, housing, manufacturing) have 
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further collapsed (despite several trillions of naira budgeted each year to improve 
the nation. Specially, a major complaint against the presidential system is its 
bloated nature. At the federal level is a bicameral legislature structure of 469 
members. Equally, there exist 36 state legislatures as well as 7888 councilors 
making bye-laws for the 774 local councils. Unfortunately, each of these selected 
officials is paid salaries, generous constitution allowances (especially in federal and 
state legislatures) and other known and unknown allowances. Again, it is shameful 
and totally uncalled for to see some state governors having up to a thousand 
personal aides and this goes to show that there is no accountability (no sense of 
responsibility). Consequently, there must be a way to check the frivolities of 
government so as avoid spending all the money on taking care of personal aides. 
 
Indeed, political office in Nigeria has been sadly turned to an all corners affair; and 
it has now become a profitable venture for men (women) of dubious pedigree. In 
fact, renowned crooks and numb-skulls have at several times emerged the proud 
occupants of noble public offices like governor, minister, senator and 
representatives. Unfortunately, the scandalous propensity for amazing hefty titles 
and bogus certificates is as a result of the fastidious primitivity and cosmetic 
values of the society. This is unlike what obtains in the civilized western world 
where the requisite for elected or appointed public office is not fundamentally the 
exhibition of bagful of titles and certificate but ingenuity, practical ability and 
record of composite service. In other words, the scramble for political office is 
indeed infectious among politicians of all shades and character. Political offices in 
this part of the world are today the cheapest means of material wealth acquisition 
and unmerited pre-eminence. Consequently, the Nigerian Anti-corruption agency 
entitled Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) has reportedly listed 
ten governors across the thirty-six states as unfit candidates to contest for any 
elective position in the proposed 2011 general elections. Basically, these governors 
were alleged to have enriched themselves and their colonies by various means of 
misappropriation, contract inflation, squander mania and money-laundering. The 
full record of Nigerian corruption list has been on the public domain and that EFFC 
website is given as www.efcnigeria.org  
However, EFCC investigations have shown that politically exposed persons (PEPs) 
after being investigated by the anti-graft agencies and charged to court allegedly 
bribe judicial officers to make sure that their cases are never tried. And knowing 
that they would eventually be found guilty and sent to jail, they wriggle their way 
to freedom through incessant against the anti-graft agencies. Unfortunately, the 
reality of our legal system is that prosecution of well-heeled individuals and the 
entire jurisprudence can be tampered with on technical grounds in the full glare of 
the best of judges. In other words, the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) members 
under the guise of fair hearing often prolong cases through Legal technicalities 
and sometimes extraneous motions. In fact, there are cases instituted over five 
years ago that have not gone beyond the preliminary stages and the court shelves 
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while waiting for a favorable political environment to completely kill the cases. 
Indeed, the 2011 election is the time to reinvent Nigeria. Therefore, our system 
must change urgently; and we must reinvent the nation on the path of truth, 
honestly and integrity.  
For no legacy is richer than honesty; and we should not be governed again by the 
tyrants of the post or their agents and surrogates.            
                                                                                                
 20 
3.0 NIGERIA: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
 
It is widely believed that in the 1960s, when the country gained independence and 
the years after, life was good. Unfortunately, what many people referred to as the 
good era, did not last long.  Subsequently, a down ward trend in socio economic 
development set in. Since then, for example, the unemployment rate has 
progressed steadily. Specifically, in 1980, the unemployment rate grew at about 
15%, while in 2010; this rate may have grown to about 25%. Similarly, in 1980, 
poverty level was said to be about 40%. But, as at 2009, Nigerians who live on 
one dollar a day has grown to about 70% of the population. Again, agriculture, 
which contributes about 45 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) is 
considered to have become unproductive (for not attracting investment) and has 
for decades remained at the subsistent level. Consequently, through the economic 
history of the country, several blue prints were designed to put the economy in 
the right direction; and these include structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and 
National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). However, in the 
faces of there challenges, the country had embarked on trade liberalization policies 
that have opened up the economy to foreign investors in different sectors, 
especially in telecommunications, power, oil and gas sectors. Here, barriers of 
monopolies have been broken and government no longer has firm gripon state-
owned enterprises. Yet, the history of the Nigerian economy and its people is 
replete with signs of economic growth without much development. That is, the 
quality of life or standard of living of a larger segment of the population (at about 
150 m people) has been anything but envious. In fact, a large number of the 
people still do not have access to the good things of life and this is evident in the 
infrastructural development gap. 
 
Consequently, the so called economic growth being celebrated by government 
agencies is not trickling down to the people by translating into thousands of jobs. 
Indeed, it is possible for the economy to post productivity gains mainly from the 
use of technology tools (Such as mobile telephony and information technology). In 
other words, some sectors of the economy are growing and they are not creating 
new jobs. For example, the telecom sector is one of those driving this growth, And 
owing to the fact that the industry is technology-driven, it has merely deployed 
newer technologies with little or no additional employment to achieve the 
perceived growth. Unfortunately, there is what the economist call disarticulation in 
the economy. This implies that there no sufficient linkages between the oil and gas 
sector and the rest of the economy; between the financial sector and small 
business, between consumption and production and between industries and 
agricultural sector. Critically, in the face of the various development plans of the 
federal government, the manufacturing sector has suffered gradual decline in its 
contribution to national output over the years. Statistically, between 1960 and 
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1970, the contribution of manufacturing to the economy rose from 4.4% to 9.4%. 
It further increased to 11.4% in 1981 and declined to 10% in 1988. Unfortunately, 
from 1995 to date, the contribution of manufacturing sector to date has continued 
to decline. Specifically, the manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) has 
revealed that manufacturing capacity utilization declined rapidly from 70.1% 
(1980) to 29.29% (1995) rising to 52.78% (2005) and eventually declining to 47% 
(2009). Apart from inconsistent policy that has hampered development of the 
manufacturing sector; infrastructural decay and double taxation have been the 
bane of the Nigerian manufacturing sector. Again, inadequate power supply, 
scarcity, and high cost of petroleum products and lack of effective transportation 
net works have put pressure on operating cost, competitiveness and efficiency in 
the local market.  
 
In particular, the absence of stable power supply has hampered the growth of the 
small and medium-scale enterprises further exacerbating the troubles of the 
manufacturing sector. 
Recently, the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) 
have identified Lack of financial discipline, corruption and over budgeting (as 
related factors) that have combined to make it impossible for the country to meet 
critical financial obligations. Here, areas of financial needs experiencing problems 
include importation, payment of salaries, servicing of debts owed local contractors 
and investment in infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, Nigeria does not generate enough funds to meet its obligation in 
these critical areas. Consequently, the country is gradually working its way back 
into the international debt trap. Specifically, Nigeria is becoming increasingly 
crippled and unable to meet its financial obligations due to outs of corruption in 
the oil industry and the misapplication of country’s revenue earnings. In fact, as at 
January 2009, Nigeria had a balance of about $24 billion in the excess crude 
account. Recently, this amount may have reduced to about $2 billion; which 
implies that the excess crude account that Nigeria is relying on to make up its 
budget deficit is gone. Unlike the previous years budget, the 2010 budget is more 
than N4 trillion with a deficit of about N1.7 trillion. Similarly, there has been 
geometric increase in the expenditure profile of the federal government without 
commensurate increase in its revenue.  
Particularly, the expenditure is heavy on the recurrent at the expense of 
investment in regeneration projects that will curb rising unemployment and yield 
revenue to government in the long run. Available statistics on the federal 
government expenditure have shown as increase in the past four years. In 2009 
alone, the federal government’s percentage of personal cost to the over all 
expenditure was 34 percent; and this is higher than capital investment whish is a 
regenerative investment. Again, as at June 2009, the foreign reserves of Nigeria 
was about $60 billion. But in less than one year, the foreign reserve has been 
depleted to about $40 billion. Although the central bank of Nigeria has reassured 
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that it has enough reserve to service import into the country; it is however not 
clear how much of the foreign reserve is used to service importation that has to do 
with investment in the real sector of the economy. 
 
Yet, the biggest problem with the country is finances in corruption which has 
grown beyond imagination over the years. It is basically because of the way 
government officials on the three tiers of government were talking money out of 
the country. In the same vein, the precarious financial position of the government 
has manifested in the inability of some government ministries and agencies to pay 
salaries. Consequently, economic experts are convinced that the dynamics of the 
Nigerian economy are hovering within negative Zones which constitute grave 
dangers if not checked. Statistically, Fitch ratings (international rating agency) 
delivered the most telling of such verdicts when it downgraded Nigeria’s sovereign 
credit rating from stable to negative (as at 2010). 
Critically, the import of this result is that there is a deterioration of the 
fundamental indicators of the economy.  
Citing the depletion of excess crude account (ECA) and heightened political 
uncertainty ahead of 2011 elections Fitch noted that the Nigeria’s current BB-, 
three notches below investment grade (constituted a threat to economic stability). 
In other words, the depletion of the ECA and continued gradual fall in international 
reserves at a time of high oil prices and record high oil production is a major 
concern. While acknowledging plans by the federal government to establish a 
sovereign wealth fund (SWF) to be governed by more robust prudential guidelines 
and removal of the fuel subsidy currently taken out of the ECA, Fitch noted that 
the implementation of these plans is not possible before the 2011 general election 
(apparently have increased short-term political uncertainty). Regrettably, it is 
ironic that the country is close to bankruptcy at a time when more funds are 
accruing to the Federal Account with crude oil price steady at around $ 75.9 per 
barrel (above the $ 65pb benchmark on which the budget was predicated). 
Unfortunately, since the beginning of the year 2010, the government has spent $ 
1 billion on the 50th anniversary celebrations; the purchase of three new jets for 
the presidential fleet, and preparation for the 2011 elections. A salary increase for 
civil servants and the military and police also cost the government additional 
billions of Naira. To meet the persistent shortfalls in the Federation Account, the 
government has (apart from the ECA) also turned to the international markets for 
borrowings. Here, the fear being expressed in many quarters is that the increasing 
spate of domestic and external borrowings would further impoverish future 
generations of Nigerians, if the country does not bead with caution. 
Ceteris paribus, it is expected that by the year 2015, Nigerians would have arrived 
at the Promised Land, where hunger and poverty would have been eradicated 
under the world-wide millennium development goals (MGDs). Under this 
programme, Nigeria would have promoted gender equality and women 
empowerment, reduced child mortality as well as improved health. It would have 
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also combated the dreaded human immune deficiency virus (HIV) and acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), malaria and other diseases.  
Critically, the federal government must have achieved universal primary education, 
environmental sustainability and global development partnerships. Unfortunately, 
this picture of a new Nigeria has turned out a pie dream. Accordingly, Amina 
Zubair (senior special assistant to President Goodluck Jonathan on MDGs) revealed 
that more than one trillion naira had been sunk in the MDG projects (since 2006 
take off year). Subsequently, Nigeria has been receiving one billion dollars (about 
N150 billion) debt relief annually from the Pairs Club (packaged for the MDGs). 
Similarly, there had been additional budgetary allocation of N110 billion annually in 
the last four years. Here, a greater proportion of this sum was given to the various 
state governments under the Conditional Grant Scheme (CGS). Indeed, other 
funds (some of which are public knowledge) have also been pouring in and are 
being expended in the name of the MDG projects since Nigeria endorsed the LIN 
declaration. However, the exact amount received and expended by the MGD office 
remains a top secret among managers of the federal government agency.  
Empirically, it has been observed that the Jumbo fund spent to meet the eight 
MDGs 2015 target may have gone down the drain while majority of the citizens 
are left to suffer from high degree illiteracy, poverty, disease and other socio-
economic and environmental problems. Specifically, one sector where money is 
said to have been spent, with no corresponding result is in the education sector.  
Indeed, given the huge expenditure to have moved closer to meeting the set 
targets by year 2010. Here, life of the average Nigerian (especially the rural poor) 
ought to have improved dramatically. Rather, the country appears to be worse off 
and indications are that Nigeria will not advance close to the set targets (even by 
year 2020). In fact, late 2009, the Economic and Financial Commission (EFCC) 
released a list of 56 prominent Nigerians who allegedly had between them 
defrauded the nation of N243 billions of the lost, only eight of the suspects 
allegedly sole in millions; 17 of them were alleged by the EFCC to have stolen in 
billions, while the amounts allegedly stolen by some others were not specified. 
Here, all the listed cases are pending in the Law courts in different parts of the 
country. While 11 were instituted and handed over to Waziri by Nuhu Ribadu 
(Former EFCC Chairman); FARIDA WAZIRI (Chairman EFCC) commenced 22 of the 
cases. Subsequently, 56 persons alleged to have committed financial fraud were 
taken to court and 33 of the persons arraigned have been granted bail by the 
court under various circumstances while 19 were remanded in prison custody. 
Again, 2 of the persons arraigned have been convicted; charges have been filed 
against one, but the suspect has refused to appear in court, while court judgment 
is currently under review in one of the cases. 
 
Indeed, the Nigerian’s vision to be among the world’s twenty top economies by 
the 2020 is commendable but for its lack of power to achieve demand, endemic 
corruption, inaccurate at the federal, state and local government levels make the 
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attainment of the vision a mirage. Statistical analysis quotes the effective demand 
for electric power in Nigeria to be only four million. This implies that only four 
million corporate and individual consumers pay for electric power consumption in 
Nigeria. Consequently, how the impact of the volume and value of this significant 
proportion of the country’s huge population can power the economy and drown 
the darning leakages and negative impact of ubiquitous parasites and rent seekers 
to deliver the overarching objectives of the national vision remains a challenge. 
Unfortunately, the rest of the consumers estimated at about twenty million are 
believed not to be paying for their consumption. This has therefore been identified 
as the base of the power sector. Again, even if they all pay, how much will this 
add up to in the demand and revenue matrix, even with the effort by the federal 
government of Nigeria? 
Consequently, power sector experts and analysts remain firm in their position that 
until this horrifying incongruity is corrected and all consumers begin to see electric 
power as an expensive service that must be paid for, all efforts aimed at achieving 
a more regular supply of electricity in the country would be futile. Thus, it is widely 
acknowledged that infrastructure deficiency is a major challenge in the country’s 
development strides even as it remains in decrepit state. 
 
Again, statistical review of the performance of Nigerian students in senior 
secondary certificate examination (SSCE) conducted by the West African 
Examination Council, (WAEC), National Examination Council (NECO) and the Joint 
Admission and Matriculation Board (JAMB) as well as other similar bodies in recent 
times reveal a tremendous drop in the quality of teaching and learning in the 
nation’s educational system. Unfortunately, what government has been doing in 
the education sector is not actually geared towards improving the quality of 
teaching and learning in the public schools. Here, it is more or less a show-piece 
for people to see them as actually doing something. Rather, what we are 
witnessing presently in withdrawal or abdication of the role of government in the 
educational sector in the guise of privatization. Infact, the recent UNESCO National 
Education Support strategy report on Nigeria bemoaned the state of the country’s 
education sector. Accordingly, the Nigeria’s educational sector is facing some 
challenges which must be adequately addressed to enable the sector play the 
expected role as the ‘Key Bridge’ for the success of the government reform 
programs. They further noted that the educational system is critically 
dysfunctional, as graduates of many institutions cannot meet the needs of the 
country. Generally, institutions are in decay and corruption has become rampant. 
Again, the adult illiteracy rate is around 50% and about 76% of children of 
primary school age attend school while the participation rate falls to less than 30% 
for children of secondary school age. The report therefore listed key areas of 
concerns and challenges requiring urgent attention to include among others: 
persisting lack of reliable and timely data; lack of planning and management 
capacities as well as good governance and transparency in educational 
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management and resource allocation; funding gap, poor and inadequate 
infrastructure and facilities. Yet empirical investigations has shown that though 
government has not rested on its oars, efforts and strategies aimed at uplifting the 
quality of education in Nigeria have not yielded the expected results. And this is 
due to policy instability and frequent change of personnel in the Education 
Ministry. 
 
 
Indeed, the plight of Nigeria’s growing number employed youths elicits fresh 
concerns, as job seekers fall victim to fraudsters and jubious charges by the 
military and Para-military to find work. These tragic loses encapsulates the fate of 
most job seekers in Nigeria, a country notorious for graduating thousands of 
university professionals every year without an effective employment plan. 
Consequently, the growing number of job seekers in Nigeria may have encouraged 
some jubious minded individuals to devise a means of extorting money and other 
forms of favour from applicants in their desperation to find elusive jobs. Here, 
even government agencies and ministries (including the military and Para-military 
services) are involved in making financial demand on the applicants through sale 
of employment forms. Thus, with unemployment figures hitting an alarming 40 
million out of a population of 145 million, experts believed that it could require the 
determined effort of Nigerian government to free the country from the grips of 
unemployment. It is therefore the intention of the Nigerian government that 
ordinary citizens should feel the tangible benefits of the economic growth by 
ensuring that gainful employment increases commensurately with inclusive 
economic growth and wealth creation. Consequently, the present administration 
will initiate a new National Job Creation Scheme which are kick starting with seed 
funding of N50 billion as provided in the 2011 budget. The proposed schemes 
interventions are multifaceted, adopting short and medium term strategies to 
create thousands of new jobs in our urban and rural communities. To immediately 
impact unemployment, a public works programme will commence across the 36 
states and the Federal Capital Territory. Essentially, this programme will involve 
the engagement of private sector contractors to implement simple, labour-
intensive public works in areas such as the renovation and maintenance of 
buildings (schools, hospitals and primary health care centers); roads rehabilitation 
and maintenance works; urban sanitation and solid waste disposal; erosion 
control; and community works projects. Again, increased emphasis will be placed 
on apprenticeship programmes and the enforcement of local content regulations to 
enhance job placement, self employment and Nigerians participation in critical 
arrears of the economy. Yet, the sincerity of the intentions of the government 
towards implementation remains questionable. 
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4.0 NIGERIA: POLICY OPTIONS 
 
Essentially, the promotion of good governance has been an important focus and 
key ingredient in developing efforts for Nigerian governments and the donor 
community since independence. While the first and second generations of 
economic reforms emphasized stabilization and structural adjustment, in order for 
markets to play a greater role in the economies; the current emphasizes on 
government issues is an admission that the nature of domestic institutions also 
matter for outcomes. But even where growth had resumed, the continued 
weakness of institutions, marked by civil strife and the absence of political 
pluralism, put the sustainability of the recovery into question. 
Increasingly, god governance (participatory and inclusive politics) has been 
identified as the missing ingredient in the reform efforts undertaken so far. 
Consequently, participation is a process and not as event. 
Thus, Nigerian’s can succeed only if they embark on homegrown visions, 
development strategies and programs with which the majority of their peoples can 
identify.  
Unfortunately, there is immense pressure to move quickly and the world is 
impatient. But one should recognize that there will often be a trade off between 
moving fast and the genuinely participatory approach. Here, if we fail to allow the 
time to genuinely open the process to different development actors and to the 
poor themselves, in the design, implementation and monitoring of poverty 
reduction strategies; we might win some immediate battles, but we may lose the 
Long-run war to develop the accountable institutions that are essential to wealth 
creation ( and poverty reduction). 
 
Thus, participation is the by which stake holders influence and share control over 
priority setting, policy making, resource allocations and program implementation. 
Basically, there is no blue print for participation because it plays a role in many 
different contexts and for different purposes. However, to achieve participatory 
outcomes at the macro economic level, it is necessary to use participatory 
approaches at both the micro economic and macro economic levels in a 
complementary manner for maximum effect. Here, these approaches entail several 
elements: as outcome oriented participation action plan, public information 
strategy and multistakeholder institutional arrangements for governance.  
Figure 4.1 shows how the various stakeholders can interact with governments to 
affect processes at the macroeconomic level. Empirically, participatory processes 
including information dissemination, dialogue, collaboration in implementing 
programs and participatory monitoring and evaluation, are most effective when 
they are designed to be outcome oriented. In planning a participatory process, it is 
therefore important to keep in mind that the outcome-based approaches that are 
initiated and the institutional arrangements that support them can have an 
enduring influence over policy making and implementation. In other words, 
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outcome-based approaches to participation at the macroeconomic level should 
provide policy makers with concrete inputs into their decision making and policy 
implementation. On one hand, open-ended participatory processes risk the result 
of generalities and vague recommendations and may not lead to direct influence 
over antipoverty policies. On the other hand, outcome-based approaches allow 
participation to be planned in such a way that all stakeholders feel included, gain 
ownership and can influence the process. Here, Table 4.1 shows a schematic for 
visualizing the process of designing a participatory process, moving from inputs to 
outputs to outcomes to impact. It also suggests a range of options, given the 
objectives of increased transparency and accountability; as well as the ultimate 
impact of effective development and poverty reduction policies and programs. 
Again, there are several   
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  (1) INFORMATION DISSEMINATION 
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  (4) COMMITTEES FORMATION AND WORKING GROUPS 
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FIGURE 4.1 GOVERNMENT PROCESSES PARTICIPATION 
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TABLE 4.1 PARTICIPATORY PROCESS DESIGN 
 
(A) FINAL IMPACT (1) Effective development and poverty   reduction 
strategies and actions  
(B) KEY OUTCOMES   (1)  Accountable, transparent and efficient processes for 
economic decision making resource allocation, 
expenditures and service delivery 
(2)  Increased equity in development policies,   goals 
and outcomes   
  (3)  Shared long-term vision among all stakeholders for 
development.         
(C) KEY OUTPUTS (1)  Ongoing institutional arrangements for participation 
and consensus building in government decision 
making processes for macro economic policy 
formulation and implementation 
(2)  Institutional capacity to demystify macro economic 
policies and budgets, analyze data and promote 
information exchange and public debates in 
parliaments, the media, and civil society. 
(3)   Development of mechanisms for negotiation and 
rules of engagement between key stakeholder 
groups 
(4)  Citizen report cards that monitor the medium-term   
expenditure framework (MTEF). 
(5) Development of feed back mechanisms and 
participatory monitoring systems that enable 
citizens and key stakeholders within the 
government to monitor key poverty reduction 
initiatives, publications, and outcomes as a part of 
poverty and implementation. 
(6)   Choice of poverty reduction actions based on a 
better understanding of the multidimensional 
aspects of poverty and its causes including 
vulnerability, insecurity and governance.      
     
(D)INPUTS:MECHANISMS       
AND METHODS 
(1)  Public information strategy (written and broadcast 
      media, web sites, etc). 
(2)  Participatory poverty assessments, integrating 
      qualitative and quantitative indicators 
(3)  Stakeholder analysis 
(4)  Participatory choice of antipoverty actions to address 
      Vulnerability, insecurity and governance 
(5)  National workshops 
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(6)   Regional or local workshops 
(7)   Focus groups and interviews 
(8)   Building networks or coalitions of NGO 
(9)   Participatory budget formulation and exp. tracking  
(10) Setting up poverty monitoring/coordination unit  
(11) Citizens survey and report card 
(12) Alternative PRSP preparation/policy proposals 
(13) Budget Demystification 
(14) Sector working groups/multistake holder  
       Representation     
   
  
guiding principles for participation that lead to more inclusive (equitable) 
processes for formulating, implementing and monitoring poverty reduction 
strategies. And yet, overtime, it has been found that processes that have the 
following characteristics can lead to effective participation and these include 
country ownership, outcome orientation, inclusive, transparency, sustainability and 
continuous improvement. However, figure 4.2 depicts an iterative poverty 
reduction strategy process and suggests various entry points for participatory 
processes. Here, it essentially shows how participation at various stages of the 
overall process can help build ownership over the strategy, make it more equitable 
to and representative of various stakeholders interests, increase the transparency 
of the policy formulation process and ultimately make the strategy more 
sustainable. Practically, there are four broad steps that can be taken in the design 
of poverty reduction strategy: poverty diagnostic, negotiation, interim PRS 
Formulation and Full PRS process. 
Consequently, there are some general characteristics in the formulation of a 
participation action plan (PAP) and these include finding the starting point for a 
country; stakeholder analysis to map stakeholders with specific concerns and 
capacities for the PAP; determining the feasible level for participation, developing 
institutional arrangements for coordinating the process; selecting from a range of 
participatory process options; costing the participatory process; and setting a 
timeline. Yet, it is critical to the PRS process to identify both short and long-term 
goals for the strategy. Here, long-term goals provide a framework for poverty 
reduction while short-term outcomes provide milestones for measuring progress 
and allowing course corrections during the poverty reduction strategy cycle. 
 
Here, once participatory processes for implementation and monitoring are 
institutionalized, they become less costly in time and resources and can provide 
effective channels for information exchange, dialogue and collaboration. It is 
therefore essential to setup feedback mechanisms which allow      
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  STAGE 1   
   
ANALYTICAL AND DIAGNOSTIC WORK         Participatory poverty assessments can 
Research to deeper the understanding         supplement conventional data  
of poverty and reflect the diversity of                  gathering and capture the multi- 
experiences according to gender, age         dimensional nature of poverty   
ethnic or regional groups, etc.          and different group needs.  
            
            
        Participatory analysis of the poverty 
  STAGE 2                               reduction impact of public  
STRATEGY FORMULATION     expenditure can generate deeper 
Analysis of the poverty reduction                        understanding than analysis by 
impact on a range of public               officials and experts only. 
expenditure options. Identification of     
public actions that will have the most     
impact on poverty.          
       Negotiation between different  
       national stakeholders over priorities can 
  STAGE 3     lead to broader ownership and accepted
 APPROVAL      consensus.    
Approval at the country level, then  
formal approval by the international             Public approval reach through 
organizations                 extensive consultations between 
        civil society representatives and 
        their constituencies.  
 
  STAGE 4         Negotiation of roles and responsi-
 IMPLEMENTATION    bilities with civil society can help 
Agreement on roles and responsibilities                  generate agreed on standards for  
with govt. and service providers at the            performance transparency and 
local level.      accountability 
Monitoring implementation       
Feed back to revise the strategy and             Participatory research can enhance 
enhance its future effectiveness    peoples awareness of their rights  
                 and strengthen the Poor’s claims 
       
   
                             Participatory monitoring of effectiveness 
           of policy measures, public service 
       performance and budgeting can 
       contribute to efficiency and 
       STAGE 5                                   empowerment of the poor.   
 IMPACT ASSESSMENT                                   
 Retrospective evaluation of the PRS to                   Participatory evaluation can bring to                       
 drive lessons for subsequent versions                     bear the perceptions of actors at  
        different levels.   
FIGURE 4.2 PRS PROCESS STAGES: PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES ASSISTANCE 
Feed 
back to  
Next 
phase 
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Participatory inputs to be incorporated into the next round of policy making and 
make the PRS an iterative process. Generally, stake holders hold some form of 
negotiation (formal or informal) to make reach a common understanding of the 
scope, extent and context of the participatory process. It is equally recognized that 
different stake holders have differing perceptions of participation; ranging from a 
one-way flow of information from civil society to governments in the form of 
beneficiary assessment; to two-way flows of information with increased 
government dissemination of information; to more cooperate and collaborate 
arrangements for making decisions and implementing programs. Indeed, 
embarking on the poverty reduction strategy process involves an initial negation 
phase that is a key process in establishing commitment by all the stake holders. In 
fact, it allows parties to discuss what they believe a participatory process entails; 
how they define poverty; and how they believe participation can influence poverty 
reduction. Thus, perceptions of the meaning of poverty are critical to the 
establishment of an effective road map that leads to a viable process. Yet, initial 
negotiations allow the stake holders of the PRS to define the scope of participation 
and their goals for using participatory methods. Here, if this goal setting is used as 
a basis for an outcome-oriented approach to the PRS, it increases the 
effectiveness of the participatory process, especially if both short and long term 
goals are set. And given that previous participatory processes have focused on 
projects rather than policy, it is necessary that stake holders come to a common 
understanding of participation at the macroeconomic level (in decision making and 
policy implementation). Thus, governments that inform a wide range of stake 
holders as early as possible about the process and content of their policy making 
and implementation tend to have grater credibility with their constituencies. In 
other words, they are able to implement their programs more effectively by 
building trust between various stake holders (both within and outside the 
government). Here, the transaction of documents into local languages and the 
production of simplified documents with key messages may be central to 
information dissemination (particularly at local levels). 
 
Empirically, monitoring public services allows citizens groups to give concrete feed 
back to the government on which it can act; and it allows community 
organizations to express their demands in a constructive way. Consequently, 
participatory approaches to monitoring enhance traditional approaches that use 
quantitative indicators by increasing the scope of what is monitored, focusing 
results from the perspectives of the poor; and including qualitative information 
that explains quantitative results. In fact, participatory approaches enable public to 
hold governments accountable for their actions or implementation and they can 
stimulate dialogue among various stake holders across the society. Thus, a well 
designed participatory monitoring and evaluation (PME) system builds on stake 
holder analyses to determine who can be involved in the PME process and what 
role they can play. Thus, through a well-designed PME process, it is possible to 
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build skills in society that will allow independent monitoring of indicators, promote 
collaboration among civil society groups to improve their negotiating power; build 
trust among different stake holder groups; increase the space for civic 
engagement in policy making; and institutionalize feedback mechanisms that allow 
poverty reduction efforts to become iterative. Indeed, the iterative nature of the 
PME (as shown in figure 4.3) is essential for its success and sustainability. Here, if 
the feedback and information that is generated from a PME process is not 
incorporated into future rounds of decision-making and program implementation; 
it is virtually useless. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that participatory 
approaches in this phase of the PRS are critical because they build ownership, 
increase transparency and improve accountability. And once the indicators and 
data-gathering methods are chosen, the issue then becomes how to analyze these 
data and then incorporate them into policy making and program implementation. 
Thus, participatory analysis of PME data provides a useful mechanism for 
negotiating among stake holders  
 
FIGURE 4.3 PRS CYCLICAL NATURE: 
PME REINFORCED 
 
 
 
                                         
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
            
            
            
            
DECIDES WHO 
PARTICIPATES 
ESTABLISH GOALS TAKE 
ACTION 
ANALYSE 
RESULTS 
DEVELOP 
INDICATORS 
PME 
LEARNING  
CYCLE 
GATHER 
INFORMATION 
 34 
Over differences in interpretation and conclusions; and it offers another way of 
building ownership over the process as well as ensuring that conclusions reflect 
the views of diverse stake holders. 
 
Technology (and realistically) Nigeria must be prepared to invest more in 
information and communication technologies (ICT); participate in the emerging 
new economy; and seek to achieve e-development (if not to catch-up, then to 
prevent being left behind). Consequently, governments have an important role in 
defining and establishing an enabling environment in which e-development can 
occur. This enabling environment supports and encourages progress within the 
country as well as setting the parameters and placing public policies that 
encourage economic and non-economic activities that increase society’s well-
being. With the rise of the new economy, the enabling environment must be 
reviewed to ensure that progress within this new world setting can be achieved.  
 
Critically, governments must remain focused on improving access levels and 
quality of telecommunication and electricity infrastructure as well as education. As 
a direct support, government will encourage private firms to invest and participate 
in the new economy; internet access and diffusion; ICT domestic market creation 
and increasing levels of democracy. In addition to these direct interactions in the 
market place, governments can also provide indirect support to private firms by 
setting and enforcing policies required to boost and protect financial returns to ICT 
investment.       
 
 In other words, governments must encourage an entrepreneurial spirit amongst 
the business communities so that investment in the new economy takes place. 
Indeed, governments must balance the recognition that the gap between rich and 
poor could be made significantly worse if the present digital divide widens, but 
that a focus on achieving e-development at the full expense of present needs will 
probably lower current levels of social well-being. Yet, e-development is as 
important as traditional development. In other words, the policies that are 
required to support e-development also support traditional development. Perhaps 
then, e-development and traditional development should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive with the new economy but rather be seen as complementary. However, 
there is great hope that e-development within the new economy will provide a 
short cut to prosperity by allowing developing countries to bypass certain 
traditional phases of development (in the conventional, long lasting and belt 
tightening process of structural change from agrarian to industrial and ultimately) 
to knowledge-based service economies. Consequently, poor countries (such as 
Nigeria) once burdened by the ‘object gap’ now have the opportunity to overcome 
the limitations of natural resources by focusing future development strategies on 
increasing knowledge-intensive investment. 
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Specially, the so-called web 2.0 revolution has opened up new possibilities for 
debate and interaction; the creation of new personal media and the sharing of it 
through sites like you tube, face book, flicker and twitter. Practically, web 2.0 is 
commonly associated with web applications that facilitate interactive information 
sharing, interoperability, user-centered design, and collaboration on the World 
Wide Web. Rather than curtail there new media channels, governments are 
encouraged to regularly explore ways that can make them ride on these channels. 
In fact, the realization has come home in Nigeria where in the complex 
relationship between politicians, media and audience, the stage is gradually 
building for what may eventually be described as the country’s first social media 
election (ceteris paribus). Consequently, the internet should be seen as a liberator, 
a tool whose possession or ability to access, allows individuals opposition parties 
and NGOS to escape the control, the state can exercise over television and radio 
channels as well as the press. This premise rest on a belief that the increasing 
penetration of telecommunication technologies and the growth of their use in 
Nigeria will allow social forces to organize, to create strong horizontal ties and to 
empower themselves; in order to join in a debate on the country’s governance, 
culture and society. 
 
Economically, sustained and healthy recovery of any nation rests on two 
rebalancing acts: Internal rebalancing (with a strengthening of private demand, 
allowing for fiscal consolidation) and external rebalancing (with an increase in net 
exports for deficit nation and a decrease in net exports for surplus nation). Thus, a 
number of policies are required to support these rebalancing acts. Essentially, the 
repair and reform of the financial sector need to accelerate to allow a resumption 
of healthy credit growth. Again, specific plans to cut future budget deficits are 
urgently needed to create room for fiscal policy maneuver. However, if global 
growth threatens to slow appreciably more than expected, a country with fiscal 
room could postpone some of the planned consolidation. However, an emerging 
economy will need to further develop domestic sources of growth with the support 
of greater exchange rate flexibility. Yet, more proactive policies are needed to 
achieve the required internal and external rebalancing. Here, monetary policy 
should stay highly supportive and should be the first line of defence against any 
larger-than-projected weakening of activity as fiscal support diminishes. And 
where policy rates rears zero, monetary policy makers may have to resort to 
further unconventional measures if private demand weakens unexpectedly as fiscal 
support wanes. 
However, if global growth threatens to slow appreciably more than expected, a 
country with fiscal room could postpone some of the planned consolidation. 
Therefore, one of the most urgent challenges is to formulate plans that help 
achieve sustainable fiscal positions before the end of the present decade. 
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Consequently, there is the task to rebuild room for fiscal policy maneuver in the 
face of still volatile sovereign debt markets. Here, such room could be needed 
because monetary policy alone might not be to provide sufficient support to 
counter the threat of a weakening of activity that is markedly more pronounced 
than expected. And yet, fiscal policy tightening will likely prove contractionary 
although the extent is difficult to guage.   
Again, the introduction of credible, growth friendly, medium-term fiscal 
consolidation plans would help limit the deflationary impact of consolidation on 
private demand in the short term. Here, such plans would have to include reforms 
to rapidly growing spending programmes (notably entitlements) and tax reforms 
that favour production rather than consumption. Thus, better financial sector 
policies and practices are critical for strengthening the resilience of the recovery to 
shocks and sustaining private demand over the medium term. Unfortunately, 
progress on this front has been very slow and apparently isolated difficulties in a 
few spots can have large spill over effects via complex financial linkages and 
deterioration of fragile confidence. Again, failure to rapidly resolve, restructure or 
consolidate weak barks and repairs wholesale markets raises the need for further 
fiscal backstopping and low interest rates to support recovery (which can also 
cause other problems. Consequently, policy makers need to continue to clarify and 
specify regulatory reform building on the improvements proposed by the Basel 
committee on banking supervision. This is expected to help financial markets and 
institutions provide more support (on a sounder basis) for consumption and 
investment that is essential for strong and sustainable growth. Here, structural 
policies that strengthen growth over the medium-term would help support the 
required normalization of macroeconomic policies and financial sector repair and 
reform are essential for stronger job creation. Similarly, labour market policies 
could enhance growth and job creation and reduce high unemployment over the 
medium term. Complementary reforms to product and service markets could also 
strengthen the employment effects by boosting labour demand and real wages 
through greater competition and lower markups on prices. However, 
 
Generally, first-generation reforms have improved macroeconomic policy 
frameworks strengthening their resilience to macroeconomic shocks. However, to 
sustain or further raise potential growth and employment, efforts could usefully 
focus on simplifying product and services market regulation, raising human capital 
and building critical infrastructure. Here, such reforms would also help absorb 
growing capital inflows in a productive manner, which would accelerate global 
income convergence and external rebalancing. So far, we can argue that much 
progress has been made through coordinated policy responses in alleviating 
liquidity strains and rebuilding confidence; and this has been essential for activity 
to rebound. Yet, the challenge ahead is for policy makers to put in place (in a 
coordinated manner) policies that support the fundamental adjustments needed 
for a return to healthy medium term growth. Again, financial re-regulation should 
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and will emphasize capital, reserve, and margin requirements, seeking to limit the 
build up of systemic risk by constraining leverage, in so far as it can be measured. 
Here, policy makers are also expected to fill the gaps in regulation, which is both 
incomplete and fragmented; this should curb regulatory arbitrage. Critically, policy 
makers should endeavor to protect people, even as they resist calls to protect 
industries, firms or jobs. Thus, the best protections a government can provide are 
education (which makes it easier to prick up new skills) and a strong rate of job 
creation (which makes it easier to find new employment). Beyond that, it is 
equally argues that governments should establish social safety nets, which provide 
a source of income to people between jobs. However, the exact form of these 
safety nets must vary, depending on the country’s level of income, her strength of 
public administration, her tax-raising powers and the extent of poverty. Yet, a 
wide array of programs could also help cushion individuals from economic shocks 
by redistributing the costs among the population or inter-temporally through the 
fiscal system. Examples of some of these programs include unemployment 
insurance; wage subsidies paid to employers to offset cyclical down turns in hiring; 
extensive public works and infrastructural spending. 
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5.0 CONCLUTION 
 
In a developing nation such as Nigeria, policy makers and political leaders have 
been forced by domestic circumstances and external donor, pressure to rethink 
the role of the state and that of its support structures in development. Thus, 
redefining the role of the state demands the creation of domestic institutions, 
including the public sector that is facilitators and not impediments to growth. Here, 
since many policies and decisions in government are taken or implemented by 
bureaucrats, they must have the necessary training and skills to do so. 
Consequently, the creation of the enabling environment for growth and 
development entails the attraction of high calibre workers to the public sector and 
putting in place facilities for training and skills upgrading. However, the 
government also needs to restructure the bureaucracy (including its size) not only 
to contain costs but also to enable the government to play meaningful wages to 
her workers. Again, proper financial management lies at the centre of good 
governance and accountability. 
 
Unfortunately, financial controls within the public sector have been weak, leading 
to serious abuse and outright corruption. 
Thus, the modernization of the financial system is crucial in the light of the 
decentralization efforts of the Nigerian Government. Similarly, there is need to 
raise the technical capacities for budgeting and financial analysis in the public 
sector. Again, government will never be able to meet all society’s social and 
development needs. It is therefore necessary to encourage the participation of civil 
society in the formulation of policies. In other words, this demands the 
decentralization of power, to increase proximity to policy makers and to make it 
possible for citizens to monitor the performance of local leaders. However, mere 
proximity is not enough to ensure that citizens will be empowered at the local 
level. Rather, they need to be encouraged to participate in decisions that affect 
them. Consequently, decentralization and local empowerment have been identified 
as the key ingredients in any strategy that seeks to promote participation, good 
governance and accountability. Yet, it demands financial and human resources at 
the local level, along with the power to local leaders to manage and allocate them 
on the basis of local decisions and needs.          
 
Indeed, the role of public sector is bound to change with the main tasks being to 
enforce policies, ensure that markets function properly and to undertake requisite 
regulatory measures. Here, the private sector should be supportive of private 
sector activities and not an impediment. And to make the public sector more 
efficient government should create independent agencies that manage key tasks 
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such as tax collection; key sectors regulation (such as communications); and the 
management of monetary policy or investment promotion. Essentially, these 
agencies are allowed to determine their own wage structures and other incentives. 
Again, governance is part and parcel of the political process. Therefore, good 
governance cannot be sustained in as environment that is characterized by 
exclusive politics. 
 
Yet, in Nigerian setting, the opening up of the political space (including the 
introduction of multi party politics and allowing a free press to operate) has raised 
the level of political accountability as well as political competition. However, the 
success achieved falls far short of the hopes raised in the 1990s (when the process 
began). And unfortunately, the behaviour of the political elite in Nigeria has not 
changed by much (as expected). Here, the key sequencing message is that 
comprehensive civil service reforms seen more likely to work where governments 
are motivated by arrangements that enable citizens to express their views and 
hold public officials accountable for results. Basically, these arrangements include 
a fair and transparent electoral process (with power-sharing arrangements to 
protect minority groups) as well as mechanisms to incorporate civil society and 
local governments within the policy making process. If governments are to be truly 
motivated by the concerns of their constituents, it is essential that the core state 
institutions have not been captured by special interests to any significant degree. 
Again, reforms can also be piloted in a particular region or municipality; and 
involving beneficiaries and other recipients of government services can help build 
a consensus on the standards to be set (the reforms needed to attain them) and 
the reporting and monitoring that will be needed to keep up the pressure for 
reform. 
 
No developing nation (such as Nigeria) therefore ignores the need to invest in 
information and communication technologies (ICT). In fact, the world economic 
environment has changed (and continues to do so) and this change highlights the 
gaps between the rich and poor. But, technology by itself is not a solution to any 
development problem; rather it is a parameter of the economic space in which 
development will take place in the future. Thus, the new economy provides new 
opportunities for countries to develop, as the ‘object gap’ that they suffer becomes 
less important than it was in the past. As always, governments must balance 
competing needs and they must engage in the new economy but accept that 
possibly mirror the frustrating and slow progress achieved with traditional 
development strategies. However, to maximize this progress, governments must 
establish a new enabling environment that supports ICT investment and 
participation in the emerging (new) economy. 
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